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Born in )84 B.C., in Stagira, a town in P'acedonia, Aristotle was the 
son of a we 11-known physic ian. As he grew, Ar ist ot le c a.ne to be ac qua. inted 
with Philip of ¥aced onia. When he was eighteen, he can:e to Athens and 
entered Plato's Academy, where he remained until Plato 1 a death in )47 B.C. 
AriS.totle moved to Aesos, in the ·rroad, Asia Minor, and remained in the 
court of Hertreias until he was invited to return to llacedon as tutor of 
the thirteen year old Prince Alexander, son of his boyhood friend, Philip. 
The young Alexander later beoane conquer or of the known war ld, during 
w-hich tine, Aristotle returned to Athena to found his own school. He 
founded his school in a suburb of Athens, the Lyceulli, and taught there 
for the next eleven years. The school received the nan:e peripatetic 
because of Aristotle's habit of walking as he taught. In the afternoons, 
he addressed larger crowds and was,therefore, seated. It was during this 
period that the Nicornachean Ethics were formulated. When Alexander 
died in 32;;, anti-Yacedonian feeling swept over Greece·. Recalling the 
fate of Socrates, Aristotle retired to his country estate and died a 
year later. 
We have a problem concerning the writings of Aristotle, namely, we 
cannot be sure whether or not Aristotle really wrote them in the form 
that we have them today. There are diacrepanc ies in his works as we 
have them today, and three principal explanations have been rnades (1) 
the works were not writ ten by Aristotle but were compiled by the students 
from their notes (2) they represent Aristotles lecture notes, and (5) 
the original writings were lost, recovered in dawa.ged form, and were 
pieced together by incompetent editors. 1 One point that would tend to 
support the first two explanations ia tbat in the Ethics, references are 
made to an audience. 
lAristotle, Philip Wheelwright, Aristotle, (New York: The Odyaaey 
Press, Inc., 19?5). -p. xviii. 
.... ~. 
/ ,,.; 
Prior to Heraclitus, the Greeks felt that all character ist ice were 
divided into two opposite poles and were, therefore, in pairs. Heraclitus 
taught that . a continuum existed from one extrerre to the other, and these 
teachings had an effect upon Aristotle as we shall see later. When con-
sidering hot and cold as an example, according to Heraclitus, there 
.was also a middle or transitional temperature with degrees of hot or 
cold proceeding in their respective direciions. Plato also admitted that 
opposites intermingle. Ari.atotle differed from his teacher when it canE 
to the question of Platenic Forina, or learning as nErely a renx;mbrance 
or archtypes .2 
As far as the naming of the NiQ·orua.chean Ethics ia ccmcerned, there 
are two main theories--one holds " that the Ethics is dedicated to Nico-
machus, Aristotle's son, and the other clain1s that Nioomachus was the 
editor of the Ethics .5 
By definition, ethics is a study of values, what is right and good. 4 
While ethics is the study, morality is the practical application of the 
results of the study. Ethics are theoretical, while morality is pragmatic. 
Politics and sociology deal with facts, and scientists are concerned 
with these. Philosophy deale with a critical analysis and eve luation 
of these facts. 
Concerning politics, the Ethics ia one-half of a a ingle treatise 
including PQ1itica 1 which Aristotle calls the "philosophy. of human 
affairs". In fact, Aristotle's ruain purpoae in writing the Etbice 
~~-I!L.- ~Q_fit '! . ~ to be a good o it izeri 'of the state. Thi e pragmatic 
2rbid, p • . xxx. 
-'William S. Sahakia.n, Systems of Ethics and Value Theory, (Patter-son, 
New Jerseya Littlefield, Adams, and Co., 1964), p. 1. 
4 Ibid., p. 2. 
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outlook stems f'rom Aristotle's rejection of the 11 other worldliness" of 
Plato's teachinga.5 Another source puts it this way-- 11 ••• in the 
Ethics and Politics, Aristotle is concerned with the good for man qua 
member of the city-etate. 11 6 He goes on to say that. the Ethics is concerned· 
with training statesmen, thereby creating the beet life for all people. 
With these things in mind, let us begin our study of the Nicomachean 
Ethics • 
The opening statement of the Ethics holds that all things must aim 
at some good. This good must be self-auffic ient and final and must be 
looked at in the light of a complete life. Since all things aim at good, 
this good must be the fulfillment of nature. This brings us to a focal 
point of Aristotle's philosophy, namely that 11 • nature does nothing 
in va in." One source holds with this interpretation-- 11 Man 1 s essential 
fun-ction is the actualization of his potentialities. 11 7 Aristotle recog-
nb ea that man is the only animal that can pervert nature, and along with 
this perver.a ion comes frustration and unhappiness. He feels so strongly 
about this that he holds that evil is this perversion of nature. Accord -
ingly, 11 ••• the function of man is activity of soul .' which follows or 
implies a rational principle. 11 8 
Man is a rationa l creature, and his uniqueness lies in his poueseion 
of an intellect . From what we ha ve seen thus far, man lives a good 1 ife 
by living according to what he rationally perceives as being in tune 
with nature or the rational pr inc iptle. The first res pons ibil ity, there~o~ 
5Arist-atle, D •. P. Chase, and J .A. Smith, The Ethics of Aristotle, 
(New Yorka E.P. Dutt.on and Oo., Inc., 1950) p. xtii. 
6Aristotle, B.H. Joachim, D.A. Reea, The Nicomachean Ethics, (Oxford: 
OlarendonPresa, 1951), p. 17. 
7Sahakian, op. cit., p. ). 
8Ar istotle, Nicomache a n Ethics. 
is to know what you are, and how much so you are, and then be it .9·~· 
Thill i mplies that each man has differe-ht potentialities and qualities. 
To live well, a man should (1) develop physically(~) cultivate his emo-
tional and psychological life and (5) unfold his inte llectua.l self' _10 
This life ia referred to as one possessing self-realization. 
To continu.e concerning good, Aristotle holds that there must be an 
u~timate good which is, as we said before, self'-sufficent, and must be 
looked at in the light of a coroplete life. He says that this ult irnate .,. 
good cannot come from chance. He holds that this good is happiness. 
Although it is the ult irna.te good, it can depend upon external good or 
proaperity to some extent, because the absence of these is a severe draw-
back to happiness. Because of this dependence, some identify happiness •.::.:-.:. 
with good f'Ortune. We see that Aristotle was speaking largely to the 
e 1 ite of society or those who were in a poe it ion to become statesmen. 
We - must not take the relationship between external influence and :,happi-
ness as the forn:er being the only requirement for the latter, however. 
The greatest good cannot oorre from chance as can external goods and pros-
perity. It must, therefore, come by study and care. Also, virtue is 
praiseworthy, but happiness is above praise. Here we have another r .ela-
tionehip, that of happiness and virtue. Happiness co:tres from eonsietent 
engagement in virtuous activit iee. 
Happiness ie the end of human nature. In other words, act ion in 
accordance with the rational principle or the following of virtue, 
which ie a product of the rational principle, ia happineee or the key to 
happiness. It is neither a diepoaition, nor does it lack anything. 
9sa};)akian, op. cit., p. 4. 
lO Ibid. , p. 6. 
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Although prosperity and good health are very important to ac.hieving 
happiness, it can be achieved, nevertheless, without them. It does not 
lie in amusement, for arnuse·nent and re laxa.t ion are not ends but are taken 
for the sake of activities. The gods experience complete happiness be-
cause their life is principally contemplative, happiness lying in 
reasoned virtue. Since animals cannot .contemplate, they cannot experi-
ence happiness. Philosophers are closest to the gods because of their 
contemplative activities, and they are, therefore, happiest. A paradox 
ar iaes when we learn that happiness, the ultimate good, cannot be obtained 
by pursuing it as does the hedonist. Rather, the hedonist pursues pleasure. 
The deriva~ions of the two words are different, pleasure coming from 
the Greed word, hedone, meaning 11 sensual ata~e 11 , and happineas coming 
from the Greek work, eudaimonia, meaning 11 beautiful state of mind 11 .ll 
At first glance, it would seem that happiness is obviously good, 
but a one philosophers do scorn it. The 1 ife of enjoyment has inherent 
advantages including those of the intrinsic value of en~oyrrent, political 
application, and the contemplative life.l2 The first advantage applies 
to those who are vulgar or young and seek happiness as does the hedonist. 
The second applies to those who channel their pursuit of enjoynent into 
political areas and seek the honor which is usually the end of political 
life. The third adv ·ntage pertains to those who, in accordance with the 
teach-ings of Aristotle, pursue happineas in the form of the virtuous and 
contemplative life. 
Al we have said, happiness comes from virtuous living in accordance 
with a rational principle. In fact, happiness is a continuum as long as 
there is engagement in virtuous activities. This leads us to the recog-
nition of virtue as a way of life ~nd not just doing the right thing in 
I 
--
llibid., p. 8. 
12 rbid. l 
one circumstance. Virtue is. acquired by repitition of the corresponding 
acta. The act ions that produce moral virtue, however, are not good in 
the earre sense as those which flm1 from virtue. Doing virtuous acts 
does not necessarily make a man virtuous. This brings up the division 
of virtues into those whic'h are intellectual and those which are moral. 
The former applies to philosophical wisdom, practical wisdom, and under-
standing, and comes largely from instruction. The latter applies to 
such things as 1 iberality. and temperance, and is obt a ined by habit. 
Moral virute is state of character which comes from a freedom to choose 
th~ right course and the percept ion to do so. It is not a pass ion or a 
faculty. Since happiness stems from virtuous living and vice versa, 
virtue is concerned with pleasure and pain. 
But what is the yardstick for virtuous acts? Ar is tot le holds that 
it is acting in accordance with a mean, or avoiding excess or defect. 
This mean is hard to define exactly in reference to certain virtues, so 
acting in accordance with the nean requires perception rather than 
reasoning, ao.oor.d_ing to Aristotle. In oases where the zrean is extremely 
difficult to discern, the lesser of two evils ma.y ne~d to be chosen. 
The mean of which we apeak i.e oft.en r'eferred to .as the 11 Golden l'.ean11 , 
an expression Aristotle did not use himself. 
Now this mean refers to the Right Act, or that act which is in accord-
anoe with nature or the rationa.rl prinoi.ple. Kant's concept of the Right 
Act is the categorical imperative, and Bentham has his hedonistic cal-
culua, while Aristotle has the 11 Golden ~an11 • The Right Act is 11 to 
do the right thing t o the right person, to the right extent, at the right 
tine, with the right motive, and in the right way.nl3 As involved as 
this is, we colD!! back to the concept that ethical superiority and moral 
excellence neoeas itate innate discernment and learning of the highest 
13 Ibid., p. 13. 
- ' 
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magnitude. In other words, the Ethics is directed at students who are 
pr!sumed to have enough general education to appreciate the points and 
have a solid foundation of good habits. In sumnary, virtue is the result 
of habitual action in accordance with the rational principle and is the 
thing which leads to happiness. 
It is important to point out. that the individual has a. free will or 
choice, which makes him morally responsible for what he does. He ie res-
ponsible for hie good actions as well as his bad actions. In moral vir-
tue, the object of choice is the result of previous deliberation. Moral 
virtue is not concerned with things which are outs ide our own power. 
vie cannot really deliberate about things we cannot control. Consequently, 
praise and blame are concerned with voluntary actions and not those 
actions which are done under compuision or out of ignorance. 
7 
Now the mean ca,n be spoken of as the Right ~ Act, which, when habitually 
practiced, becomes virtue and is concerned with virtuous actions. On 
the other hand, deficiency and excess can be spoken of aa the immoral 
act, which, when habitually practiced, becomes vice· and ·is concerned with 
vicious ac t ions. Herewith will follow a. discussion of certain of Aris-
totle's means and accompanying extremes. 
Courage is concerned with the feelings .of fear and confidence. The 
motive of it is the sense of honor, and the opposite vices are cowardice 
and rashness, or foolhardiness. There are five things which are often 
improperly called coura.ge--(1) the courage of the citizen soldier, ac-
cording t -o compulsion (2·) experience with regard to the con~lict, or 
professional coolness (5) passion, or action from strength of feeling 
(4) overconfidence bacause - of success, and (5) ignorance of danger. 
Courage is involved with pain, but the pleasure which corres with the vir-
tue is resultant. Courage could be spoken of as rac i ng and fearing the 
the right thing : , for the right motive, inthe right way, at the right 
titte, and feeling confidence under the corresponding conditions.l4 
Temperance is the rre an between insenadbil ity and 1 icentiousne sa. 
When considering this virute, we should understand the world, sensual 
and sensuous. The first is base and refers to appetites and desires. 
The second de a ls more with appreciation of music and art. At any rate, 
bodily pleasures lead us to self-indulgence and to the extree in which we 
become like animals. The self-indulgent man is pained when he is not ex ;- , 
periencing pleasure, while the temperate man is not. Temperance reflects 
the rational principle, which Aristotle refers to as 11 an obedient and 
chastened state 11 • The temperate man craves for the ' things he ought, 
when he ought, as he ought. 
Liberality is the lt'ean in regard to wealth. It lies between the "-;· _ _ 
extrettes of illiberality and prodigality. The nark of a li\)eral man is 
to give to the right people, the right amounts, at the right time, with 
all the other qualifications that accompany right giving, and ,~hat too 
with pleasure or without pain. He who gives with pain is not lib.eral be-
cause it is the nature of the 1 iberal a nd virtuous man not to loo'k to 
himself. ~anesa or illiberality is much more plentiful than prodigality 
and cannot cure itself as does prodiga lity. The inclusion of liberality 
as a virtue brings us a gain to the point that Aristotle wrote the Ethics 
primarily for a privileged group. He does say that liberality is relative 
to a man's substance. Finally, the liberal are almost the best loved of 
all virtuous characters since they are us~ful. 
Magnificence goes a step beyond liberality and has to do with the 
spending of large sums of money tastefully. It is the nean between 
14 d lbi • , P• 20. 
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vulgarity or showiness and niggardl ineas or hea ita.tion. This virtue, 
of course, applies only to the ric:h. 
Magnanimity 1 ies between. the extreme a , hurail tty >:1nd vanity. It is a 
high self-res pect, which makes a person self-euffic ient but not conceited 
or vain. It deals with pride, which Aristotle says is a mark of a good 
man. He even goes so far as to s ay that the greatest external good is 
honor. Magnanimous rrenaak for little but give help readily. Aristotle 
gets quite ca.ught up in his description of a magnanimous nan and pictures 
him as one who admires nothing very much, is open in hate and love, is 
not mindful of wrongs, haa a slow step, deep voice, and level utterance, 
and admires beaut·if'ul rather than profitable things. 'rhe na.gnanimous man 
is Aristotle's ideal. 
The extrerrea, lack of ambition and ambitiousness, have no name for 
their nean. This problem arises chiefly from the fact that ambit ion can · 
be both good and bad. Sonet in"es the ambitious man is praised and, at 
other times, censored. The s ame applies to def.iciency. 
Gentleness l iea between unirasc ibility and irascibility. Good temper 
is another name for this n:ean or virtue. One extreme is anger, and the 
other is a sort of indifference. It is hard to draw the line between the 
two states. The mean involves being angry at the right things. 
Truthfulness lies between boastfulness and self-depreciation or un-
derstateroont. The truthful man tends to understate the truth, howe-ver. 
Both extremes are actually a form of boasting when we consider the effect 
that self-depreciation can have ·. The situation can be sorrething akin to 
11 fishing for a complixrent 11 • A. truthful man is truthful even when then is 
nothing to lose or gain, just for truth's sake. 
Wli:.ttiness is the possession of a tactful, whoeson.:e sense of humor. 
The extremes of excess and defect are buffoonery and boorishness. This 
virtue is connected with intelligence since this mean requires a man to 
9 
be ready-witted. Along with the virtue of wit comes tact, or the sense 
of what to say at what titre, and vice versa~ 
Friendliness lies between contentiousness and obsequiousness or 
flattery. An obse quious person can be likened to a 11 Yes Man 11 • A man 
corresponding to the middle state could be called a good friend. Now there 
are three types of friends, detlerrnined by the motives for friendship. 
First, there are friends for utility, such as business friends. Secondly, 
there are friendships based upon pleasure, and these are hedonistic. 
Thirdly, there is a good and pure kind of friendship. The first two are 
esaent ially selfish motives, while the last pertains to the rrean. 
This pure friendship, is baaed upon an equality. Perfect friendship 
is the friendship of n~n who are good and alike in virtue, and who, there-
fore, are on e qual terms. Along with this likeness comes a mutua l rec og-
nit ion as bear i ng goodwill. Friendship is gre atly pro rr oted by common 
upbringing and a imilar ity of age. Virtue is import a nt bec ause bad men 
are laden with repentance, and if a man cannot sta nd himself, he ca nnot 
be friendly. If we are wretched, we should work to av oid wicked ness and 
endeavor to be good. This is the only wa y that . we can be friendly. Sour 
I 
or old people do not make friends easily. Neither do young people because 
their relationships tend to be more emotiona l or amorous. !nequality can 
exist in friends-hip, as in the case of friendship between a f ather and son. 
Other types of friendship ard.se from the- relationships among siblings, 
strange11~3 schoolfellows, and the 1 ike. 
There is a certain amount of wish for gain in friendship. Owing to 
ambit ion, we wieh to be loved rather than to love. Being loved, in our 
estimation, is akin to honor. This desire for benefits in friendship is 
espectally strong in unequale. In an unequal friendship, love is propor-
tional, the better party bei.ng the best loved. The benefactor receives 
10 
more than the reoeive.r of love because of th~ resulting debt of gratitude. 
This gives rise to a certain amount of selfishness in friendship. People 
love more, that which is a product of their own labor, hence, the greater 
love of a woman toward her children than the man. This selfishness is 
not bad in the case of vittuoue people. In other words, by nature of 
his attitudes and relative goals and acts, a good man should be a lover 
of self, while a wicked man should not. 
Goodwill is not like friendship. A person can have goodwill toward 
strangers. It does, however, seem to be the beg inning for friendship and 
is an inactive fr iendehip which a.r ises on account of some exce lle nee or · 
worth. Another type of relationship whicb resembles friendship is unan-
imity. 'rhis is a friendly relationship born of a common goal rather than 
identity of opd:nion. 
Unanimity is related to the point that friendship is very important, 
even necessary, in government. The feeling of working toward a common 
advantage is necessary in communities. Of courae,utility friendship is 
irrevocably related to politics. Aristotle holds that a de mocracy is the 
be-st atmosphere for friendship. An oligarchy results in a poor distri-
bution of what belongs to the city, and tyranny is characterized by an 
individual 1 s pursuit of his own good. These three types of government 
are deviations from the three constitutions--tyranny from· monarchy, oli-
garchy from aristocracy, and democracy from timocra.cy. De mocracy is the 
least harmful of the deviat. ion. Just ice and friendship char acterize 
constitutions while injustice and lack of fr iendehip characterize devia-
tions. In democracy, however, friendship exists because of equality. 
Parallels of the constitutions may be found in households. 
The happy man should have the great est of all external goods, friends. 
Since ma n is a political cre ature and . one whose nature is to 1 ive with 
11 
others, a. happy man needs friends. Since life seems to be essentially 
the acts of perceiving or thinking, a happy man will need just not any 
kind of friends, but virtuous friends. Too many friends are superflous 
or a hindrance to the noble 1 ife. Love is an excess of fr iendahip which 
can be felt toward only one person. Since good and virtuous friends are 
limited, we must be content with even a few in a lifetime. Friendship is 
more necessary in bad fortune, but is more noble in good fortune. In 
either case, the presence of friends is desirable. 'rr,e values of a group 
0£ friends determine what they do together, hence noble deeds come from 
noble men. If a friend is irrevocably changed for the pad, it is all 
right to end the friendship • . If, however, it is not drrevocable, you 
should try to help hiro. 
In conclusion, friendship is the most desirable of external goods 
and 1 ies between the extrerres, content iouanesa and obsequiousness. It 
is a state of character based upon equality and thrives more readily in 
the presence of two a imilar and virtuous rren. It is unlike friendship 
for utility or pleasure beca use it is self-dependent, while they are 
tr s.nsient. It is concerned with politics, snd it more readily lives in 
a democracy because of equality. ·ro possess the character of friendship, 
one must be a good friend. 
Modesty lies between the extrerres, sharreleesnesa and bashfulness • 
. This virtue deals with fee 1 ings and stat es of mind. Shaire is not good in 
adults, but is permissable in youth. In fact, it is praised in youth. 
Shame is fear of dis honor and is connected with bad act ions. 
Justice is the summary of all v1irtue. It will find out the person 
who is pretending virtue. Justice is of two types, f a irness and lawful-
ness, which is divided into d iatr ibut ion of wealth and dealing with 
criminals. The forrrer, fairness, is particular, while the latter is 
univers a l. Justice is the virtue with regards to our acttion toward others 
12 
and' probably the highest since it concerns the others. The just has 
to do with a proportion that is geometrical, which, when violated, is 
unjust. In other words, by acting unjustly, one term of the proportion 
becomes too great, and the balance of just ice is upset. Reef:. if'icatory 
justice is concerned with the addition and subtraction of gain or loss, 
or the restoration of the proportion. Justice lies between the excess 
and defect of unjust action and be i ng treated unjustly. In other words, 
the proportion deals with the amount of harm or advantage received. 
You can act unjustly but not be unjust. By the same token, j uat 
acts do not make a. man just. The terms, just and unjust, apply only when 
the acta are voluntary. In other words, there are things that are unjust 
but that are not acts of injustice. When an act is done out of ignorance, 
it is a mistake. When something happens contrary to reasonable expectation, 
it is a misadventure. When something is done with deliberation, it is an 
act of injustice. Such planned injustic.e makes a man unjust. Being 
unjustly treated, of course, is usually involuntary. Modest people 
treat themselves unjustly, however. A man like this largely makes up for 
it by receiving honor and hobility accordingly. 
Suicide is not unjust to a man since it is voluntary. The injustice is 
suffered by the state. Suicide is fairly unique in that the man does 
the harm and· suffers it at the sane time. The determination and enforce-
ment of just ice is a complex process. For instance, a man, more or leas, 
owns hi! household, so there is a difference between househbl~ d and politi-
cal joetice and equality. In conc lusion, justice ia the middle term 
in an equal proportion, which, when upset, results in injustice. 'fhings 
can only be called just or- unjust when they are done voluntarily. Justice 
has been called the highest virtue because of its relationship with the 
other virtues. 
Pleasure is the most closely related to human nature of all experi-
ences. Some philosopher• say it is good while othere say it is not. 
The opposition between pain and pleasure is the avoidance of one and 
pursuit of the other. Pleasure is in degrees and differs with different 
people. It is not the ultimate good, and not all pleasure is deaira:bte. •. . . 
Disgracrful pleas urea are not really pleasant. Sone pleaeures, however, 
are good. Pleasure is present when both object and race iver are at their 
best. It accompanies activity, and since there can be no continuous 
activity, pleasure has to atop sone.t ime. 
The stt~dy of pleasure and pain belongs to the political philosopher. 
Th~ main or it ic isms of pleasure are that it is a proceaa toward an animal 
state, the temperate man avoids it, the practical man pursues freedom 
from pain rather than pleasure, it is a hindrance to thought, there is 
no art to it while goodness is a product of art, children and brutes 
pursue it, and so_ne pleasures are base and .harmful. On the other hand, 
some pleasures are not bad, such as those involved in learning. Besides 
pleasure is better than pain. In the final analysis, pleasure can be good, 
' but it is not the good at which all things ai~, and it can actually dull 
a person. In one . man •-a . interpretation, pleasure is not the primary con-
stituent of well being, but rather an inaeperable accident of it.l5 
The good is arrived at by thought, fixed by intent ion,. aimed at by 
will, under the influence of practical wiadom. 16 This brings us to the 
discussion of wisdom. The soul ·'has the two types of virtues, those of 
character and those of intellect. The two .P.arts of the souJ ·:, are the one 
that gu.sps the rational principle and the one that grasps the irrational. 
15Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, (Boston& Beacon 
Press, 19)1), p. 54. 
l6rbid., p. 141. 
. :: , 
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Of the part that grasps the rational principle are the part that grasps 
the invariable and the part that grasps the variable. The invariable 
can be grasped by calculation, while the variable must be grasped by 
deliberation and contemplation. The three things that control action 
and truth in the soul are sensation, reason, and des ire. Sensation or igi-
nates no action. Good choice results from a coupling of true reasoning 
and deliberate desire. Intellect plus character produces action. 
Thus, de 1 iberat ion is concerned with the future. 
The soul possesses truth by way of affirma.t.ion or denial of art, 
acientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, and intuitive 
reason. Scientific knowledge is eternal and necessary, and all of it .is 
capable of being taught. In science, there is the inductive, whicrJ leads 
to universals, and the deductive, which proceeds from the inductive. 
Now, art is concerned with things made, while reason or wisdom is largely 
concerned with things done. Practical wisdom deale with generalities, 
rrot particulars. It ia not scientific because there is no contemplation 
about necessities, and it is not art because it concerns doing rather 
than making. It can be defined as the true and reasoned state or capacity 
to act with regard to the things that are good or bad to man. It is a 
virtue. Along with art, it concerns variables, while eo ient ific knowledge 
concerns universal truths. Scientific knowledge i .e different in that it 
results from intuitive reason rather th!i-n practical wisdom. 
Philosophic wiadom is a coupling of intuitive reason and sc-ientific 
knowledge and concerns practical wisdon; when act :i.on is lnvol ved. Ar is-
tot le said that priloaopbic wisdom was remarkable, admirable, difficult, 
divine, and useless because it did not seek human goods. He said that 
one should have both philosophic and practical wisdom, but that the 
latte.r should be preferred to the former. 
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Pract'ical wisdom nd political wisdom are of the same state .of mind 
but different essence. The forrrer deals with generalities while the latter 
deals with particulars. A young man of practical wisdom is not to be 
found, because he lac s experience and knowledge. of particulars. A 
boy can be a mathe\ina.t cian but not a philosopher. Deliberation or 
inquiry into particul re does not concern scientific knowle~ge because -.· 
there is no inquiry iJ:to known things i 
do not concern conjec lure bec~~ee there 
and it lis hurried. THey do not cone ern 
just skill in conject Ire. They are not 
they are already known. They 
is no reasoning in guessing, 
readiness of mind because this is 
opinion. Deliberation is correct-
ness of thinking, not for evil ends, not by wrong means(false syllogism), 
and not if it takes t f o long. 
Understanding ie Jot concerned with invariable a, is close to practical 
wisdom, and deals wit judging. Learning plus practic r1. l application 
ie understanding. Oor:rect judgment is synipathet ic and strives to < ..:: 
dis cern what is true. The cumulation of these qua lities is thought to 
be largely the result of na:tural endowments. 
Philosophic wisdq ·: p.ro.duc~s happiness because the person is a part 
... , ... 
of the total virtue'. : : V:i ,rtue concerns actions. How to do these things 
deals with f aculty ahd ; ·cleverness. Wickedness perverta and deceives u.s, 
making it imp~aaitile + be practically wise without being good. 
Now, for philosopHic wisdom to be usef.ul at all, a person must not 
be .incontinent, In o1hor words, he nust act in accordance with hio 
reason. Practical wisdom is the strongest of all states and most opposed 
to incontinence. Oo1inence is regard to appetite is not temperance 
because temperance li~ens one to a person who has a bad appetite. 
I Oontinence is bad whe it is dognatic. Folly coupled with incontinence 
is virtue. Act.ing by the continence of others is fallacious. Oont inence 
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is concerned with specific objects. Anger and passion are two things 
which lead to incontinence. Lower animals are not continent because 
they have no judgrrent. Aristotle asks the question of whether there is an 
incontinent person without qualification and whether all men are inc ont in-
ent in some things. 
It is pointed out that we regard bodily pleasure to excess as a fault 
while money, gain, and honor to excess are not a fault. This leads us to 
the dis cuss ion of self-indulgence, with which cont ine nee and incontinence 
deal. Self-indulgence is a habit, is contrary to nature, and can be 
injurious to the syatem • . A self-indulgent man is not apt to change 
while incontinence, in itself, is more flexible. 
B.:rutiahnees and morbidity are extensions of incontinence. Now anger 
ia better than gluttony beca use it is more natural. Anger is ~ot the 
result of plotting. Pain accompanies anger. A bad man is much worse than 
an angry man or a brute. 
Incontinence is not a vice. The fi.rst principle is preserved within . 
an incontinent man. Rather it is intermittent badneii_e. Incant inence 
can come both through adhering to the wrong and ignoring the right. 
Continence comes by abiding by the right choice. A man connot have prac-
tical wisdom and be incontinent. An incontinent man may either ignore 
his deliberation or just not take the time and trouble to deliberate. 
Most men lie between lives of extreme continence and extreme incontinence. 
This completes the discussion of the content of the Ethics. As was 
eaid before, the Ethics cornpr ises the first part of a general treat iae, 
the second part being Politics. The Ethics was written especially to 
train atatearren who could then apply the teachings to helping form a 
society in which other ~n could achieve happiness. The love of virtue 
needs to be instilled in the youth. l ,aws should direct and punish 
accordingly. The punishment should fit the cri.rne. Along with the 
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teachings of philosophers like himself, Aristotle holds that the family 
and private education do much to shape the young per·aon. \'lith the intra-
duct ion to Pol it ice, Aristotle concludes the Nicoma.chean Ethics. 
The Ethics of Aristotle have had an effect on later philosophers. 
Hie philosophy lends itself to modification for religious purpoaee. 
In Thomas Acquinas' Summa. contra Gent ilea, he goes along with Aristotle 
in stressing the importance of self-realization and the possession of will. 
He goes on to agree with Aristotle that there is a summum bonum in the 
form of happiness. Acquinas held that ultimate happiness caue · through 
contemplation of God. He alio recognized the importance of nature and 
natural law and described it as resulting from God 1s will. Acquinas 
outlined virtues with his S'even Carq inal Virtues, temperance, f ·ort itude, 
wisdom, justice, faith, hope, and charity. The last three are taken from 
the Bible, but the first four resemble Aristotle's virtues. 
To go on concerning Acguinas, he said, 11 The good is the object of 
every appetite. 11 Therefore, all action is for good, and evil is 
incidental, ace idental, or unitent ional. Evil is not neeeasary to nature, 
and there is ··no supreue evil. There is one auprene good, which is ~od. 
All things tend toward God, and the supreme effort or object of . Man's 
knowledge ·is to know God. ~an is adapted by nature to tend to God, and 
the last end is to understand God. This is the end of the intellectual 
life. Anima ls have neither intellect nor joy. Carnal pleasure does 
not bri.ng happiness since ultimate happineu utilizes intelligence. 
Alii can be seen, Acquinas took the Ethics of Aristotle and applied 
them to Christianity. This thirteenth century philosopher determined, 
by hia writings, for a long time, the moral philosophy of the Roman 
Oatholic Church.l7This work was initiated by Albert the Great and completed 
l7 Ibid., p. 140. 
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by St. Thomas Acquinal. Aristotle's philosophy was a little Neo-
Platonic, and Acquinas drew heavily from Augustine for his Christian 
doctrine.l8 The Jesuits closely followed the writings of.Acquinas. 
Aristotle 1 a concept of personal good achieved through part ic ipat ion 
in civilization profoundly influenced the so-called Neo-Hegel ian idealist, 
'rhomas Hill Green, who e:aid that ·11the self is the social self. 11 19 
Also, the lw\l~Hm ethical work, Ibn ll.a.skawaihi, .. is largely patterned after 
the Ethics. The British people as a whole are rather firmly entrenched 
in Ar istote 1 ian ism. 20 
In conclusion, the Nicomachean Eth~ca stressed happiness as the 
ultimate good, which was achieved by acting in accordance with reason 
and nature and by living according to a 11 Golden M:lan11 • It was written 
pril!'arily to train statesnen and leads into a discussion of politics. 
It haa had far-reaching . e-ffect, including that of largely forming the 
bas is of the ethical s:ystem· of the Roman Catholic Church, when coupled 
with the teachings of Christ·: 
One source hold,f! that 11 there is probably~ n~ .. trea.tise so masterly 
as Aristotle's Ethica, and containing so much close and valid thought, 
that yet leaves on the reader's mind so s-trong an impression of diaperaive 
and incomplete work. 2 1 . Lot .ia, however, easily grasped and mastered, 
thereby capable of having a widespread following, readily practicable, 
provides an easy-to-follow, middle-of .. the~road philosophy, and ~~· easily 
18Ibid., p. 141. 
19vergil ius Ferm, Encyclopedia of Ma.rala, (New Y"~~: Philosop-hical 
Library, 1956), p. 191. 
20sah!\{ ian, op. cit., p. 11. 
21Sidgwick, op. cit., P. 70. 
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adaptible to religion, as in the cases of Acquina.e for Christianity 
and Aver roes for the Arabs .22 
Furthermore, the Ethics is an analytical reflection upon the common 
moral conec iousnesa of the day, there by having hiator ical interest. It 
gives us an idea of the nra ir and good 1 ife 11 , which was the ideal for 
the Greeks. 2; This concludes our discussion of the Nicomachean_Ethics. 
22Sahak ian, op. cit. , pp. )9-40. 
2;Sidgwick, Ci>p. cit., p. 58. 
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